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CERTIFYING QUESTIONS IN FIRST 
AMENDMENT CASES: FREE SPEECH, 
STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, AND DEFINITIVE 
INTERPRETATIONS 
CLAY CALVERT* 
Abstract: In the First Amendment-based speech cases of both Minneso-
ta Voters Alliance v. Mansky in 2018 and Expressions Hair Design v. 
Schneiderman in 2017, Justice Sonia Sotomayor forcefully contended 
that the United States Supreme Court should have certified questions 
about statutory meaning to the highest relevant state court. This Article 
examines certification—its purposes, its pros, and its cons—in cases 
pivoting on whether ambiguous state statutes violate the First Amend-
ment. Mansky and Expressions Hair Design provide timely analytical 
springboards. The Article argues that certification carries heightened im-
portance today. That is because the justices now frequently fracture 
along perceived political lines over when a case involving speech merits 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny and when it deserves only rational 
basis review. This rift was vividly exposed in 2018 in both National In-
stitute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra and Janus v. American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. Although not a 
panacea, question certification might sometimes eliminate such splinter-
ing. The Article ultimately proposes four criteria for helping the Court to 
decide when certifying a question of state law in a First Amendment 
case is appropriate. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, The United States Supreme Court’s ruling in the First Amend-
ment free speech case Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky pivoted on statu-
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tory interpretation.1 The state statute at issue2 banned wearing “[a] political 
badge, political button, or other political insignia”3 inside polling places on 
election days. 
After concluding that these venues on such days are nonpublic fora,4 the 
seven-justice majority declared the law unconstitutional for not defining the 
crucial term “political” and for being of “indeterminate scope.”5 Writing for 
the majority, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that if a state wants to limit parti-
san friction at polling places, then it must clearly define the parameters of the 
prohibited activity and precisely explain its reasoning for the ban.6 Roberts’ 
opinion failed to mention the vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth doctrine 
in its analysis.7 The majority instead found that the ban, due to definitional 
                                                                                                                           
 1See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky (Mansky IV), 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018) (holding that Minne-
sota’s political apparel ban violated the Free Speech Clause because the statute lacked clarity). 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The 
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated nearly ninety-five years ago through the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local 
government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (assuming 
“that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from 
abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”). See generally 
Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Interpretation, 2012 U. Ill. L. 
REV. 1103 (providing an overview of traditional methods of statutory interpretation, including 
textualism, intentionalism, purposivism, pragmatism, and dynamism, and offering a new approach 
to statutory interpretation focusing on contemporary meaning and expectations). 
 2 MINN. STAT. § 211B.11 (2012), invalidated by Mansky IV, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (depicting a list 
of prohibited election day activities near and in polling places). 
 3 Id. (banning political apparel at or about polling places during primaries and elections); 
Mansky IV, 138 S. Ct. at 1882. 
 4 Mansky IV, 138 S. Ct. at 1886. The Court found that “[a] polling place in Minnesota quali-
fies as a nonpublic forum” and that “[i]t is, at least on Election Day, government-controlled prop-
erty set aside for the sole purpose of voting.” Id. 
 5 Id. at 1888–89 (reasoning that the term “political” can be read broadly and explaining that 
Minnesota’s authoritative guidance on what constitutes “political” apparel makes it difficult to 
determine what apparel is or is not appropriate at polling places). 
 6 Id. at 1891 (reasoning, “if a State wishes to set its polling places apart as areas free of parti-
san discord, it must employ a more discernible approach than the one Minnesota has offered 
here”). 
 7 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (noting that due process 
“requires the invalidation of laws that are impermissibly vague”); United States v. Williams, 553 
U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)) (observing that a law is 
void for vagueness if it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is 
prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforce-
ment”); see also Williams, 553 U.S. at 292 (noting that under “our First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech,” and 
adding that the justices “have vigorously enforced the requirement that a statute’s overbreadth be 
substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate 
sweep”); Frank D. LoMonte, Fouling the First Amendment: Why Colleges Can’t, and Shouldn’t, 
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difficulties, failed to satisfy the reasonableness criterion of the Court’s doc-
trine for nonpublic fora.8 
In a dissent joined by Justice Stephen Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
contended that the case first should have been certified to the Minnesota Su-
preme Court before the law was declared unconstitutional.9 Sotomayor ar-
gued that clarification by the North Star State’s highest court might have pre-
vented the Court from grounding its decision on arbitrary distinctions.10 So-
tomayor reasoned that the United States Supreme Court should shy away 
from invalidating state laws without first seeking the state’s interpretation.11 
For Sotomayor, certification was a clear route that her colleagues failed to 
take.12 
 Mansky was not the first time Sotomayor opined that certifying a ques-
tion of statutory interpretation to a state court was the proper threshold step in 
a First Amendment-based free speech case. Just one year prior in Expressions 
Hair Design v. Schneiderman,13 Sotomayor penned a concurrence joined by 
                                                                                                                           
Control Student Athletes’ Speech on Social Media, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 6–7 (2014) (explain-
ing that a law “may be declared void for vagueness if it fails to give intelligible notice of the be-
havior that will result in penalties”). 
 8 Mansky IV, 138 S. Ct. at 1886. As Chief Justice Roberts framed the issue in Mansky, “[t]he 
question accordingly is whether Minnesota’s ban on political apparel is ‘reasonable in light of the 
purpose served by the forum’: voting.” Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). Justice Roberts opined for the majority that the Minnesota 
law failed this deferential test, explaining that: 
[T]he State must draw a reasonable line. Although there is no requirement of narrow 
tailoring in a nonpublic forum, the State must be able to articulate some sensible ba-
sis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out. . . . Here, the un-
moored use of the term “political” in the Minnesota law, combined with haphazard 
interpretations the State has provided in official guidance and representations to this 
Court, cause Minnesota’s restriction to fail even this forgiving test. 
Id. at 1888. 
 9 Id. at 1893 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the Minnesota Supreme Court could 
have provided “a definitive interpretation of the political apparel ban”). 
 10 Id. (positing that certification would “obviate the hypothetical line-drawing problems that 
form the basis of the Court’s decision today”). 
 11 Id. at 1897. 
 12 Id. (calling certification an “obvious step”). 
 13 See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman (Expressions Hair Design II), 137 S. Ct. 
1144, vacated, 877 F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 2017). The United States Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On remand, the 
Second Circuit certified a question of the case to the New York Court of Appeals. The New York 
Court of Appeals accepted the certification in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 92 
N.E.3d 803 (N.Y. 2018) and answered the certified question in the affirmative in Expressions Hair 
Design v. Schneiderman, 117 N.E.3d 730 (N.Y. 2018). 
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Justice Samuel Alito.14 In it, she blasted the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit for taking a circuitous route.15 She contended that the 
Second Circuit abused its discretion by not certifying the case to the New 
York Court of Appeals to interpret a statute banning merchants in the Empire 
State from imposing surcharges on customers paying with credit cards rather 
than cash.16 Pointing to the law’s ambiguity, Sotomayor reasoned that it was 
subject to multiple interpretations;17 one of which affected the First Amend-
ment right of merchants to describe surcharges to patrons.18 Justice So-
tomayor asserted that certification could have prevented the Court from mak-
ing a constitutional determination if the state court interpreted the statute to 
be a price regulation and not a speech regulation.19 Thus, Sotomayor and 
Alito concluded that the Court should have vacated the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion and remanded the case with directions to certify it to the New York Court 
of Appeals for further clarification regarding the statute’s meaning.20 Concur-
ring separately, Justice Breyer agreed that the remand would afford the State 
of New York the opportunity to provide a detailed explanation of what the 
statute entails and requires.21 
In fact, the Second Circuit in December 2017, on remand, certified the 
case to New York’s highest appellate court to address the following question: 
“Does a merchant comply with New York’s General Business Law § 518 so 
long as the merchant posts the total-dollars-and-cents price charged to credit 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Expressions Hair Design II, 137 S. Ct. at 1153 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (reasoning that 
the majority’s decision failed to adequately address the petitioners’ full First Amendment chal-
lenge to the New York statute). 
 15 Id. at 1157 (stating that the Court “rejected certification, abstained in part, and decided the 
question in part”). 
 16 N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 518 (2012); see Expressions Hair Design II, 137 S. Ct. at 1158 (“Given 
the significant benefits certification offered and given the absence of persuasive downsides identi-
fied by the Second Circuit, the decision not to certify was an abuse of discretion.”). 
 17 Expressions Hair Design II, 137 S. Ct. at 1154 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that the 
New York statute could have been read narrowly by focusing on the plain text, read in relation to 
the lapsed federal ban that prohibited merchants from charging surcharge fees to credit card using 
customers, or read more broadly based on the lack of definitions in the statute). 
 18 See id. at 1155 (“Petitioners view § 518 as an unconstitutional restriction on their ability to 
display and describe their prices to their customers. And so they sued and challenged the law on 
First Amendment grounds.”). 
 19 Id. at 1158 (“The Second Circuit should have exercised its discretion to certify the anteced-
ent state-law question here: What pricing schemes or pricing displays does § 518 prohibit? Certifi-
cation might have avoided the need for a constitutional ruling altogether. If the state court reads 
§ 518 only as a price regulation, no constitutional concerns are implicated.”). 
 20 Id. at 1159. 
 21 Id. at 1153 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that he “agree[d] with Justice Sotomayor that on 
remand, it may well be helpful for the Second Circuit to ask the New York Court of Appeals to 
clarify the nature of the obligations the statute imposes”). 
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card users?”22 The New York Court of Appeals accepted certification of that 
question in January 2018.23 In October 2018, it answered the query in the 
affirmative,24 without reformulating it.25 In summary, the Second Circuit cer-
tified the case on December 6, 2017,26 and the New York Court of Appeals 
responded on October 23, 2018.27 The turnaround was slightly more than ten 
months. In brief, the issue did not linger and languish on the New York Court 
of Appeals’ docket, but instead was resolved in less than one year. 
The ball, as it were, is now back in the Second Circuit’s court in the 
most recent iteration of Expressions Hair Design.28 The state statute was de-
finitively interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals to mean that a mer-
chant complies with it “only if the merchant posts the total dollars-and-cents 
price charged to credit card users.”29 In terms of the speech issue lurking 
therein, the New York Court of Appeals held that so long as the “total dollars-
and-cents price charged to credit card users” is disclosed, then “merchants are 
free to call the price differential anything they wish without fear of prosecu-
tion under the statute.”30 The Second Circuit now must determine whether the 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman (Expressions Hair Design I), 877 F.3d 99, 100 
(2d Cir. 2017). Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Debra Ann Livingston opined, 
“[f]inding aspects of the New York statute at issue in this case unclear, and, further, that the reso-
lution of these ambiguities will determine the course of our constitutional analysis, we defer deci-
sion and certify the following question to the New York Court of Appeals: ‘Does a merchant 
comply with New York’s General Business Law § 518 so long as the merchant posts the total-
dollars-and-cents price charged to credit card users?’ The New York Court of Appeals may refor-
mulate or expand this certified question as it deems appropriate.” The Supreme Court majority in 
Expressions Hair Design II concluded that the New York statute “regulates speech.” 137 S. Ct. at 
1151. The Second Circuit therefore did not have the option on remand that Justice Sotomayor 
wished it had previously exercised—namely, certifying the question of whether the statute regu-
lated speech or only conduct. Id. 
 23 See Expressions Hair Design, 92 N.E.3d at 803. 
 24 See Expressions Hair Design, 117 N.E.3d at 730–31. 
 25 See id. at 733 (“Although plaintiffs have requested that we reformulate the Second Circuit’s 
question, we see no need to rephrase it.”). 
 26 Expressions Hair Design I, 877 F.3d at 99. 
 27 Expressions Hair Design, 117 N.E.3d at 730. 
 28 Rich Samp, ‘Expressions Hair Design’ Speech Case Back on Track After Detour to NY State 
Court, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2018/10/31/expressions-hair-
design-speech-case-back-on-track-after-detour-to-ny-state-court/#72b97d036633 [https://perma.cc/
AY76-BY7H] (observing that “the New York Court of Appeals issued a definitive interpretation 
of the statute, and the case is finally ready to move forward again in the Second Circuit,” and 
adding that “[t]he case now returns to the Second Circuit”). 
 29 Expressions Hair Design, 117 N.E.3d at 736–37 (reasoning that posting credit card sur-
charges amounts allows consumers to see the true cost of using a credit card in comparison to 
making a cash purchase at stores). 
 30 Id. (reasoning that disclosing the credit card surcharge is enough for merchants to comply 
with the statute and the way merchants describe the credit card surcharge is irrelevant). 
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law, as interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals, constitutionally re-
stricts commercial speech.31 
Justice Sotomayor’s recent calls for certification were joined in two in-
stances: one by liberal-leaning Justice Breyer;32 the other by staunch con-
servative Justice Alito.33 This indicates that certification sometimes appeals 
across ideological lines on today’s politically fractured Court, thereby making 
its use especially relevant. 
This Article examines the benefits and drawbacks of certification by the 
nation’s highest court in disputes affecting the First Amendment freedom of 
speech, filling a scholarly void on this topic.34 Part I provides a primer on 
certification as a procedure that federal courts can adopt in cases involving 
ambiguous state statutes.35 Part II then explores in greater depth whether cer-
tification may have been appropriate in Mansky and Expressions Hair De-
sign.36 Part III argues that certification is particularly relevant today, as it may 
reduce fracturing among the justices on whether heightened First Amendment 
scrutiny or mere rational basis review is warranted in a case involving a state 
law.37 Part III also proposes four criteria to help the Court determine when 
certification is suitable in free expression cases.38 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Barbara S. Mishkin, NY Court of Appeals Issues Interpretation of NY “No Credit Card Sur-
charge” Law, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.
com/2018/10/26/ny-court-of-appeals-issues-interpretation-of-ny-no-credit-card-surcharge-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/H8UW-R6FS] (explaining the New York Court of Appeals opinion in Expressions 
Hair Design and describing the Second Circuit’s next steps in analyzing the New York statute).  
 32 See Peter Baker, A 3-Decade Dream for Conservatives Is Within Reach, N.Y. TIMES, July 
10, 2018, at A1 (describing “the four-member bloc of Democratic appointees on the court” as 
including Justice Breyer); Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, Foundation Was in Place for Ideo-
logical Shift to the Right, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2018, at A16 (describing Justice Breyer as one of 
the Supreme Court’s “four-member liberal wing”). 
 33 See Adam Liptak, Diatribe by Nominee Threatens Neutrality of Court, Some Fear, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2018, at A1 (noting that Justice Alito “has forged a consistently conservative 
voting record”); David G. Savage, Back Story; His Conservative Revolution; Leonard Leo Has 
Worked for Years to Transform the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2018, at A2 (reporting 
that “Alito has been a steady, predictable conservative” since joining the Court, and adding that 
“[w]hen the court has been split, he has not joined with the liberals in any case of significance”). 
 34 The author examined the law review indices of these two databases in both September 2018 
and December 2018 for such articles. 
 35 Infra notes 39–84 and accompanying text. 
 36 Infra notes 87–128 and accompanying text. 
 37 Infra notes 129–175 and accompanying text. 
 38 Infra notes 176–178 and accompanying text. 
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I. CERTIFICATION: AN OVERVIEW 
When the United States Supreme Court—or any federal court, for that 
matter—analyzes a state law, it engages in “intersystemic adjudication”39 be-
tween dual federal and state court systems with overlapping jurisdiction.40 A 
key issue for the Court is keenly understanding state law,41 especially when it 
provides the necessary predicate for resolving federal constitutional ques-
tions,42 including First Amendment queries. 
Certification is a primary method used by federal courts for ferreting out 
meaning when presented with unsettled state-level legal issues.43 Certification 
is “a procedural mechanism that empowers a court to obtain a definitive an-
swer to an unclear or unresolved question of law presented in a case before it 
by posing the question to another court that possesses the authority to act as 
the final arbiter of the content of that law.”44 In brief, certification is a transju-
risdictional procedure, facilitating feedback between federal and state courts.45 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1244 
(2010) (describing how federal courts apply state criminal laws during trials to resolve federal 
question cases that also encompass state and local laws). 
 40 Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2005). As Professor Schapiro explains it: 
[I]n the United States, the jurisdictions of the state and federal courts overlap exten-
sively. Issues of state law commonly arise in and are adjudicated by federal courts; 
issues of federal law commonly arise in and are adjudicated by state courts. Such in-
tersystemic adjudication, by which I mean the interpretation by a court operating 
within one political system of laws of another political system, is pervasive. 
Id. 
 41 Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. 
REV. 305, 306–07 (1994) (providing suggestions to make certification more equitable and allow 
federal courts to properly decide cases that include state law interpretation). 
 42 Stewart v. Smith, 534 U.S. 157, 160 (2001). 
 43 City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 470 (1987) (stating that certification is an important 
tool for federal courts to utilize); cf. Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal 
Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1681 (2003) (“Today, certi-
fication is the primary method by which federal courts faced with undecided questions of state law 
are able to enlist the aid of state courts to resolve those questions.”); Verity Winship, Certification 
of State-Law Questions by Bankruptcy Courts, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 483, 488 (2013) (“In general, 
certification from federal courts of appeal has become a well-established piece of the federal juris-
dictional landscape.”). 
 44 Peter Jeremy Smith, The Anticommandeering Principle and Congress’s Power to Direct 
State Judicial Action: Congress’s Power to Compel State Courts to Answer Certified Questions of 
State Law, 31 CONN. L. REV. 649, 650 (1999) (providing an overview of certification and as-
sessing Congress’s authority to compel state courts to answer certified questions). 
 45 Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 1869, 1874–76 (2008) (explaining the different types of transjurisdictional adjudication 
procedural devices that courts can use to resolve cases including certification). 
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Certification is relatively new to the United States judicial system. Flor-
ida adopted the first certification statute in 1945, allowing a federal court to 
certify a question of state law to the highest state appellate court.46 This pro-
cedure, however, laid dormant for fifteen years before first being used in 
1960.47 
Certification carries multiple benefits. First, it provides federal courts the 
opportunity to address federalism concerns by requesting a state’s highest 
appellate court to definitively interpret state law. Second, certification simpli-
fies the adjudicative process by reducing litigation costs, decreasing delayed 
determinations, and ensuring that a state has the ability to interpret its own 
law.48 Put more bluntly, certification enables federal courts to do something 
more than just guess how a state’s highest court might interpret a state stat-
ute.49 In fact, federal court speculation about what a state appellate court 
might say is often wrong.50 Thus, certification is consistent with the Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Ques-
tions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 381–83 (2000). This article explains this history: 
In 1945, acting with what the United States Supreme Court termed “rare foresight,” 
the Florida legislature enacted a statute permitting federal courts to certify unre-
solved state law questions to the Florida Supreme Court. Florida thus became the 
first state to offer this procedural mechanism in lieu of abstention in cases where 
federal courts were faced with open state law issues. When the United States Su-
preme Court praised the statute fifteen years later, however, the Florida Supreme 
Court had yet to implement it. 
Id. (citations omitted) (referring to Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207 (1960)). 
 47 Id.; see also Coby W. Logan, Certifying Questions to the Arkansas Supreme Court: A 
Practical Means for Federal Courts in Clarifying Arkansas State Law, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK 
L. REV. 85, 86 (2007) (noting that although “the Florida Legislature passed the first statute in the 
nation that authorized the Florida Supreme Court to adopt rules for receiving certified questions 
from federal courts” in 1945, “the statute was not utilized until fifteen years later when the United 
States Supreme Court, no less, actually used the statute for the first time” in Clay, 363 U.S. 207). 
 48 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997) (requesting the Arizona 
Supreme Court to certify a question regarding its state law before the federal court continued its 
adjudication). 
 49 See Haley N. Schaffer & David F. Herr, Why Guess? Erie Guesses and the Eighth Circuit, 
36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1625, 1626 (2010) (observing that “when there is no case directly on 
point, a federal court . . . must make what is informally referred to as an ‘Erie guess’ . . . [which] 
is an attempt to predict what a state’s highest court would decide if it were to address the issue 
itself”). The name “Erie guess” is derived from the Supreme Court’s seminal ruling in Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). There, the Court held that “[e]xcept in matters gov-
erned by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the 
law of the State.” Id. at 78. 
 50 Jessica Smith, Avoiding Prognostication and Promoting Federalism: The Need for an In-
ter-Jurisdictional Certification Procedure in North Carolina, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2123, 2133 (1999) 
(“In fact, the evidence reveals that federal courts ‘get it wrong’ in a significant number of cases.”). 
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Court’s insistence that federal courts should not make constitutional determi-
nations that are rooted in preliminary conjectures of local law.51 
Furthermore, certification makes sense because state court judges are 
authorities on state law and thus are better equipped to construe it.52 Certifica-
tion is often viewed favorably as respecting and enhancing state courts’ au-
thority and prestige.53 Framing this point somewhat differently, federal-to-
state certification can reduce friction between federal and state courts,54 
thereby assuaging federalism concerns.55 
Moreover, certification allows federal courts to avoid addressing the 
constitutionality of a statute by affording state courts the opportunity to nar-
rowly interpret it in a way that does not constitutionally invalidate it.56 Addi-
tionally, as suggested later in Part II, Section B, certification taps into another 
strand of the avoidance canon—namely, that the Court should avoid constitu-
tional questions when possible.57 
Not all questions of interpretation of state statutes, however, merit certi-
fication. The Supreme Court observed in 2000 that certification “is appropri-
                                                                                                                           
 51 Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) (highlighting federal 
courts refraining from adjudicating cases that require preliminary state law interpretation until a 
state court interprets the state law because this is a fundamental canon of constitutional adjudica-
tion). 
 52 Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State 
Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 159 (2003) (“[T]he state law ques-
tion is sent to those more expert in state law—the state court judges. Certification advocates pre-
sume that state court judges . . . will be better equipped than federal judges to determine and inter-
pret state law.”). 
 53 Justin R. Long, Against Certification, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 124 (2009) (arguing 
that federal courts should interpret state law questions without certification in an effort to better 
understand and respect state law). 
 54 Molly Thomas-Jensen, Certification After Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona: A 
Survey of Federal Appellate Courts’ Practices, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 139, 139 (2009) (providing 
an overview of certification and an analysis of how federal courts determine whether to certify a 
question to state court). 
 55 Kaye & Weissman, supra note 46, at 422 (highlighting that certification breaks silos and 
allows federal and state court communication and cooperation); see Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 
U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (noting that certification “helps build a cooperative judicial federalism”). 
Federalism is a term often used to describe the vertical division of powers “between the federal 
and statement governments.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 3 (5th ed. 2015). 
 56 United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 (1909) (ex-
plaining that this facet of the larger avoidance canon holds that when a statute is “reasonably sus-
ceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other val-
id, it is our plain duty to adopt that construction which will save the statute from constitutional 
infirmity”); Stuart Buck & Mark L. Rienzi, Federal Courts, Overbreadth, and Vagueness: Guid-
ing Principles for Constitutional Challenges to Uninterpreted State Statutes, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 
381, 397 (explaining that certification gives deference to state courts to interpret its own laws in a 
way that keeps them within constitutional bounds). 
 57 Infra notes 113–114 and accompanying text. 
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ate only where the statute is ‘fairly susceptible’ to a narrowing construc-
tion.”58 Additionally, certification is only possible if a state has a certification 
statute that authorizes certification and details the process.59 Today, nearly all 
states have such a procedure.60 Many have adopted some variant of the Uni-
form Certification of Questions of Law Act.61 This Act was approved in 1967 
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and 
the American Bar Association.62 
For instance, Oregon’s certification statute provides, in relevant part, 
that the state’s highest appellate court: 
[M]ay answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court 
of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, a 
United States District Court, a panel of the Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel Service or the highest appellate court or the intermediate ap-
pellate court of any other state . . . if there are involved in any pro-
ceedings before it questions of law of this state which may be de-
terminative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as 
to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling 
precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court and the intermedi-
ate appellate courts of this state.63 
The certification statutes of Minnesota and New York are especially im-
portant for this Article. They are relevant in both Mansky64 and Expressions 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945 (2000) (citing Hill, 482 U.S. at 468–71). 
 59 Nash, supra note 43, at 1690 n.74 (citing Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 
476, 493 n.21 (1983)) (noting that certification is available “if the state whose law is at issue of-
fers a certification procedure for the federal court to exercise” and “[a] federal court will not ask a 
state high court to respond to any questions of state law if there is no procedure under state law 
that authorizes certification”). 
 60 See Cochran, supra note 52, at 159 (“Today, in forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, 
and Puerto Rico, some or all federal judges can certify a question to the state’s highest court, ask-
ing that court to answer the question.”); Henry duPont Ridgely, Essay, Avoiding the Thickets of 
Guesswork: The Delaware Supreme Court and Certified Questions of Corporation Law, 63 SMU 
L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2010) (“Today, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted 
a certification process, in one form or another.”). 
 61 Cf. Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A Proposal for 
Reform, 18 J. LEGIS. 127, 128 (1992) (noting that the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law 
Act “long ago achieved widespread acceptance in federal diversity cases”). 
 62 Stella L. Smetanka, To Predict or to Certify Unresolved Questions of State Law: A Pro-
posal for Federal Court Certification to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 725, 
725 (1995) (arguing that Pennsylvania should adopt a certification statute like the majority of 
other states and providing guidelines for what the statute should entail). 
 63 OR. REV. STAT. § 28.200 (2017) (explaining Oregon’s certification process). 
 64 See supra notes 87–102 and accompanying text (addressing Mansky IV). 
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Hair Design,65 in which Justice Sotomayor contended that certification was 
appropriate. 
Minnesota adopted the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act 
in 1998.66 The North Star State’s statute provides that the State’s Supreme 
Court: 
[M]ay answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the 
United States or by an appellate court of another state . . . if the an-
swer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the 
certifying court and there is no controlling appellate decision, con-
stitutional provision, or statute of this state.67 
If the Minnesota Supreme Court receives such a request, it has options 
about what to do next. It can: (1) accept the question as written, (2) accept the 
question and reformulate it, or (3) reject the question.68 Reformulation per-
mits the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis to “more closely track[] the 
fundamental issue raised in the case.”69 If the court accepts a question, the 
statute requires it to respond “as soon as practicable,”70 with the court review-
ing the question de novo.71 
New York’s constitution provides that: 
The court of appeals shall adopt and from time to time may amend 
a rule to permit the court to answer questions of New York law cer-
tified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a court of 
appeals of the United States or an appellate court of last resort of 
another state, which may be determinative of the cause then pend-
ing in the certifying court and which in the opinion of the certifying 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See supra notes 103–128 and accompanying text (addressing Expressions Hair Design II). 
 66 Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F. Supp. 286, 298 (D. Minn. 1990) 
(explaining that the federal court has the discretion to certify a question to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court). 
 67 MINN. STAT. § 480.065 (2012) (providing a comprehensive explanation of Minnesota’s 
certification process). 
 68 Id. (explaining that although the Minnesota Supreme Court has the discretion to decide 
which course of action to take regarding the question, it must notify the certifying court of its 
decision). 
 69 Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ill. Paper & Copier Co., 848 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Minn. 2014) (ex-
plaining why the Minnesota Supreme Court narrowed the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit’s four certified questions to one targeted certified question that focused on the 
narrower description of “representation of law” which is “a representation of future legal compli-
ance”). 
 70 MINN. STAT. § 480.065. 
 71 See Gen. Cas. Co. Wis. v. Wozniak Travel, Inc., 762 N.W.2d 572, 575 (Minn. 2009) (“The 
certified questions presented are questions of law that we review de novo.”). 
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court are not controlled by precedent in the decisions of the courts 
of New York.72 
The New York Court of Appeals implemented this constitutional provi-
sion through a rule of practice.73 Under that rule, the New York Court of Ap-
peals may accept or reject a question certified to it.74 As in Minnesota, New 
York’s highest appellate court may reformulate questions it agrees to an-
swer.75 Furthermore, in taking questions from the Second Circuit—the federal 
appellate circuit that encompasses New York—the New York Court of Ap-
peals may be asked directly by the Second Circuit to expand or modify a 
question.76 
The Second Circuit recently called certification “sometimes prudent and 
appropriate”77 when it faces a novel state law question.78 It has observed that 
certification is especially useful for questions of state law that are recurrent 
and have a significant impact on the public.79 
In terms of disadvantages, certification has been criticized as delaying 
adjudications.80 That, however, is not necessarily accurate. For instance, one 
study found that cases that were certified to state courts were resolved in less 
than six and a half months after receiving a definitive interpretation from the 
                                                                                                                           
 72 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3, para. 9 (explaining the jurisdiction of New York State Court of 
Appeals). 
 73 See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 500.27 (2018), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ctapps/500rules.htm#Disc 
[https://perma.cc/DP88-2FPL]. 
 74 See id. at 500.27(d) (stating that the court must assess the merits of the certified question 
before deciding to accept or reject it). 
 75 See Griffin v. Sirva, Inc., 76 N.E.3d 1063, 1068 (N.Y. 2017) (reformulating a question 
posed to it by the Second Circuit because “other factors” are relevant to the determination of the 
question beyond the ones that the Second Circuit’s “question presumes”); Beck Chevrolet Co. v. 
Gen. Motors LLC, 53 N.E.3d 706, 712 (N.Y. 2016) (reformulating a question posed to it by the 
Second Circuit “in accordance with our discretion in these matters”). 
 76 See Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 946 N.E.2d 159, 161 (N.Y. 2011) (noting 
that the Second Circuit asked the New York Court of Appeals to alter the certified question as it 
deemed appropriate); Israel v. Chabra, 906 N.E.2d 374, 377 (N.Y. 2009) (“The Second Circuit 
authorized our Court ‘to expand, reformulate, or modify this question’. . . and we have accepted 
both the certification and the invitation to reframe the inquiry.”). 
 77 Alphonse Hotel Corp. v. Tran, 828 F.3d 146, 156 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting “a question of state 
law that . . . is dispositive of the case before us and has not yet been decided by the highest tribu-
nal of the state whose law we are applying”). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Kidney v. Kolmar Labs., Inc., 808 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that certification is 
important for questions that “seem likely to recur and to have significance beyond the interests of 
the parties in a particular lawsuit”). 
 80 Smith, supra note 50, at 2143 (explaining certification benefits and why North Carolina 
should adopt a certification statute in order to promote judicial economy); see also M. Bryan Schnei-
der, “But Answer Came There None”: The Michigan Supreme Court and the Certified Question of 
State Law, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 273, 295 (1995) (“A second problem identified by certified question 
opponents is that the certification procedure causes undue delay in adjudicating the federal action.”). 
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state court.81 Another criticism is that certification may be abused by federal 
courts that desire to lessen their caseload.82 Moreover, some argue that de-
tours through state court systems may lead to higher costs for litigants.83 
All of these concerns, however, may be unfounded. As one article noted 
two decades ago, the fear that certification increases costs, prolongs the adju-
dicative process, and burdens state courts’ caseload seems unsubstantiated.84 
With this background on certification in mind—including the certifica-
tion statutes in Minnesota and New York that might have come into play in 
Mansky and Expressions Hair Design, respectively, had Justice Sotomayor 
had her way—the next Part returns to those cases for closer scrutiny. 
II. A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE CERTIFICATION IN  
MANSKY AND EXPRESSIONS HAIR DESIGN 
This Part has two sections. Section A examines the certification issue in 
Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky,85 and Section B tackles it in Expres-
sions Hair Design v. Schneiderman.86 Both sections examine the arguments 
militating for and against certification in these recent cases. 
A. Certification in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky87 
As noted in the Introduction,88 Justice Sotomayor contended that the 
Court in Mansky should have certified an issue of statutory interpretation to 
the Minnesota Supreme Court rather than striking down, on a facial chal-
lenge,89 a statute affecting political speech because it failed to explicate a crit-
                                                                                                                           
 81 Smith, supra note 50, at 2144 (highlighting that a “study of forty-eight cases in which certi-
fication was used found a median time of only 6.36 months from certification to obtaining the 
state court’s answer, with a range of less than one month to two and a half years”). 
 82 Cochran, supra note 52, at 160 (highlighting that some federal courts “seek to reduce their 
workload and avoid the time-consuming process of deciding or predicting difficult questions of 
state law”). 
 83 See Yonover, supra note 41, at 332 (citing “increased delays and costs associated with 
certification” as criticisms of certification). 
 84 William G. Bassler & Michael Potenza, Certification Granted: The Practical and Juris-
prudential Reasons Why New Jersey Should Adopt a Certification Procedure, 29 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 491, 511 (1998) (highlighting that this fear has failed to materialize due to the federal 
courts’ comity and the state courts’ discretion to answer the certifying question). 
 85 See infra notes 87–102 and accompanying text.  
 86 See infra notes 103–128 and accompanying text. 
 87 Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky (Mansky IV), 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018). 
 88 See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (addressing Justice Sotomayor’s call for certi-
fication in Mansky IV). 
 89 See Mansky IV, 138 S. Ct. at 1885 (noting that the Court granted the petition for a writ of 
certiorari on a facial challenge to the statute). 
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ical term.90 At least two factors, however, militated against certifying the 
question in Mansky. 
First, the case had already traversed the federal court system for eight 
years, with a district court first ruling on it in 2010.91 The case was later heard 
not just once, but twice, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit.92 Certification by the United States Supreme Court to Minnesota’s 
highest appellate court would have added more time, expense, and delay to an 
already protracted legal battle. Thus, in the spirit of a justice-delayed-is-
justice-denied mentality found in criminal prosecutions,93 resolution of the 
matter by the nation’s high court in 2018 was appropriate. As Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote in response to both Minnesota and Justice Sotomayor’s argu-
ment that certification was appropriate, that request “comes very late in the 
day.”94 
Second, Mansky involved core political speech affecting elections. Such 
expression resides at the heart of the First Amendment, and any law that 
might impermissibly limit or prohibit it merits both swift and careful judicial 
review.95 In 1971, the Supreme Court reasoned that First Amendment protec-
tions should be especially safeguarded during political campaigns for public 
office.96  
Furthermore, any delay of justice on a First Amendment free speech 
claim is particularly egregious. To wit, the Court opined in Elrod v. Burns,97 
more than forty years ago, that any deprivation of core First Amendment pro-
                                                                                                                           
 90 Id. at 1882. As encapsulated by Chief Justice Roberts in writing for the majority, the rele-
vant provision of the statute at issue banned the wearing of “a political badge, political button, or 
anything bearing political insignia inside a polling place on Election Day.” Id. 
 91 See Minn. Majority v. Mansky (Mansky I), No. 10-4401, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116240 
(D. Minn. Nov. 1, 2010) (denying a motion for a temporary restraining order to stop enforcement 
of the statute), rev’d, 708 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2013) (Mansky II), rev’d, 849 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 
2017) (Mansky III), rev’d, Mansky IV, 138 S. Ct. 1876. 
 92 See Mansky III, 849 F.3d 749; Mansky II, 708 F.3d 1051. 
 93 See, e.g., United States v. Hastings, 847 F.2d 920, 923 (1st Cir. 1988) (observing that “jus-
tice delayed is justice denied”). 
 94 Mansky IV, 138 S. Ct. at 1891 n.7. 
 95 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). As Justice Anthony Kennedy 
explained in 2010, “political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by 
design or inadvertence. Laws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ which 
requires the Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrow-
ly tailored to achieve that interest.’” Id. 
 96 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (reasoning that the press’s First 
Amendment free speech right to publish articles on a political candidate’s criminal history during 
a campaign is protected speech). 
 97 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372–73 (1976) (stating that firing government employees 
because of their political affiliation violates the First Amendment). 
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tections would result in severe harm to an aggrieved party.98 Indeed, courts 
deem free speech restrictions exceptionally harmful.99 Viewed from this per-
spective, the Court in Mansky was correct to strike down a law that negatively 
affected political speech rather than wait for a possible—but definitely not 
certain—saving interpretation and construction from Minnesota’s Supreme 
Court. 
For the Mansky majority, the time had come to strike down a statute and, 
in turn, to provide some advice to the Minnesota legislature about how it 
might go about drafting a new and better statute to serve its interests.100 This 
was not the moment, eight years deep into litigation, to possibly save a statute 
by certifying a question to a state court that might—but not necessarily—give 
the statute a narrowing construction. 
On the other hand, as for the issue of certification arising too late (or, at 
the least, very late) in the litigation of Mansky, Justice Sotomayor frankly 
responded that certification cannot be forfeited.101 There is, in other words, no 
statute of limitations imposed either on when a party can request or when the 
nation’s highest court can issue a certification order.   
Sotomayor explained why this must be the case. She asserted that Min-
nesota’s delayed certification request does not mean that the Supreme Court 
must deny the state court the opportunity to interpret its own state law.102 
Thus, although the Mansky majority was content to let the Minnesota legisla-
ture go back to the drawing board to craft a better drafted law rather than give 
the state judiciary a chance to save a poorly explicated one during a certifica-
tion hearing, the dissent seemingly focused more on balancing powers and 
promoting comity in the relationship between the federal and state court sys-
tems. In brief, Mansky illustrates both pros and cons of the United States Su-
preme Court certifying questions in First Amendment-based cases. 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Id. at 373 (observing that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal peri-
ods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury”). 
 99 Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the Standard for Preliminary Relief, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 197, 201 (2003) (providing a background on how courts assess specific harms and arguing 
that it is actually difficult for courts to truly weigh the parties’ benefits and harms when deciding 
to issue a preliminary injunction). 
 100 Mansky IV, 138 S. Ct. at 1891. The majority observed that its ruling was “not to say that 
Minnesota has set upon an impossible task. Other States have laws proscribing displays (including 
apparel) in more lucid terms.” Id. 
 101 Id. at 1895 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (reasoning that certification is a tool that is used to 
prevent friction between the federal and state courts and “certification is not an argument subject 
to forfeiture by the parties”). 
 102 Id. (reasoning that “delay in asking for certification does nothing to alter this Court’s re-
sponsibility as a matter of state-federal comity to give due deference to the state courts in inter-
preting their own laws”).  
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B. Certification in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman103 
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Alito, contended that 
certification was appropriate in Expressions Hair Design.104 Specifically, she 
would have vacated the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit’s earlier decision in the case and remanded the case with directions to 
certify it to the New York Court of Appeals to further clarify the relevant stat-
ute.105 
Expressions Hair Design arguably offers a more compelling scenario for 
certification regarding a statute’s meaning than Mansky. Mansky simply 
boiled down to whether a state had reasonably defined a key term—
“political”106—that clearly affected speech privileged by the First Amend-
ment.107 In brief, Mansky was about the clarity (or, more accurately, the lack 
thereof) of a particular word. It was not for the Court, at least in the majority’s 
view, to send the case back to a state court via certification to possibly give 
the statute a saving construction. Rather, it was time for the Minnesota legis-
lature—after eight years of litigation—to rewrite it.108 
In contrast, the issue of statutory interpretation in Expressions Hair De-
sign dealt with a more outcome-determinative and foundational issue—
namely, whether or not the First Amendment freedom of speech was even 
relevant. As Justice Sotomayor explained in her concurrence, if the New York 
statute merely regulated price, then there would be no need to conduct a con-
stitutional analysis.109 
Under such an understanding of the statute—one conceptualizing it as 
an economic regulation, not as a speech restriction—the deferential rational 
basis review standard would apply.110 No form of heightened First Amend-
                                                                                                                           
 103 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman (Expressions Hair Design II), 137 S. Ct. 1144, 
vacated, 877 F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 104 Supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text (addressing Justice Sotomayor’s call for certifi-
cation in Expressions Hair Design II). 
 105 Expressions Hair Design II, 137 S. Ct. at 1159 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (observing that 
certifying the question to the New York Court of Appeals is a better solution than the majority’s 
piecemeal decision). 
 106 See Mansky IV, 138 S. Ct. at 1888 (noting that the statute “does not define the term ‘politi-
cal,’” and adding that what is political “can be expansive”). 
 107 See supra notes 95–96 (describing the privileged position of political speech in First 
Amendment jurisprudence). 
 108 See Mansky IV, 138 S. Ct. at 1892 (concluding that Minnesota’s statute lacked clarity and 
was incapable of reasoned application). 
 109 Expressions Hair Design II, 137 S. Ct. at 1158 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (adding that 
certifying the question to the New York Court of Appeals could have either avoided the need for a 
constitutional review or limited the scope of the constitutional claim). 
 110 Lynn S. Branham, Toothless in Truth? The Ethereal Rational Basis Test and the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act’s Disparate Restrictions on Attorney’s Fees, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 999, 1016 
 
1366 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1349 
ment review would come into play.111 As Sotomayor succinctly put it, 
“[c]ertification might have avoided the need for a constitutional ruling alto-
gether.”112 
Such an interpretation, in turn, would have allowed the Supreme 
Court—upon return of the case to its jurisdiction after resolution of the certi-
fied question by the New York Court of Appeals—to exercise the last resort 
facet of the canon of constitutional avoidance.113 New York’s highest appel-
late court, in other words, might have given the nation’s highest court an op-
portunity to dodge a First Amendment question. When viewed doctrinally, 
that would have been ideal because it would have allowed the Court to skirt a 
constitutional assessment, given that the state court’s statutory construction 
would have made the constitutional question obsolete.114 
In Expressions Hair Design, it could have well been that a ruling by the 
New York Court of Appeals might have made the First Amendment question 
                                                                                                                           
(2001) (explaining that rational basis review “requires only a rational relationship between the end 
(the legitimate governmental objective) and the means to that end (the statute whose constitution-
ality is at issue)”); Nicholas Walter, The Utility of Rational Basis Review, 63 VILL. L. REV. 79, 79 
(2018) (noting that rational basis review is “typically applied to review of economic and social 
regulations”). Put differently, a court will declare a law unconstitutional under rational basis re-
view “if it is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.” Thomas B. Nachbar, 
Rational Basis “Plus,” 32 CONST. COMMENT. 449, 449 (2017); see Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional (and Desirable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 403 
(2016) (asserting that “the Court has basically gotten it right about when to apply the rational basis 
test—using it to analyze government economic regulations and social welfare legislation when 
there is no discrimination based on a suspect classification or infringement of a fundamental 
right”) (emphasis added). 
 111 See infra notes 129–130 and accompanying text (addressing the strict scrutiny and inter-
mediate scrutiny standards that apply in First Amendment jurisprudence). 
 112 Expressions Hair Design II, 137 S. Ct. at 1158 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 113 Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding Unconstitutionality, 
128 HARV. L. REV. F. 331, 332 (2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
06/vol128_CalebNelson.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC36-EGPG] (elucidating the criticisms of the 
“canon of constitutional avoidance” and illuminating the difference between the canon about 
avoiding unconstitutionality and the canon about avoiding constitutional questions); see Lisa A. 
Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1994) (“The ‘last 
resort rule’ dictates that a federal court should refuse to rule on a constitutional issue if the case 
can be resolved on a nonconstitutional basis.”). As framed by Justice Louis Brandeis, “if a case 
can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a ques-
tion of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.” Ashwander v. 
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 114 Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal 
Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. 
REV. 397, 399 (2005) (“The most fundamental canon is that courts should not decide a constitu-
tional issue if there is some plausible way to avoid it. A corollary to this rule is the familiar canon 
of statutory interpretation that a serious constitutional challenge to a statute should be avoided if 
the statute can plausibly be construed in a manner that makes the constitutional question disap-
pear.”). 
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disappear. Justice Sotomayor, in fact, raised the subject of the constitutional 
avoidance canon in her concurrence, although Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion 
for the Court failed to mention it.115 Furthermore, the fact that the Second 
Circuit had already given its interpretation of the New York statute would not, 
in Justice Sotomayor’s view, prohibit the Supreme Court from certifying the 
question about what the statute means. As she explained, it would be improp-
er for the Supreme Court to “defer to a lower federal court’s interpretation of 
state law even where doing so would cast serious constitutional doubt on, or 
invalidate, a state law.”116 
Ultimately, Sotomayor did not prevail on her quest for certification. The 
majority waded deeply into the interpretation muddle and concluded that 
New York’s anti-surcharge statute did, in fact, involve speech and therefore 
raised a First Amendment issue.117 The Court thus: (1) vacated the Second 
Circuit’s earlier decision holding that the statute did not involve speech,118 
and (2) remanded the case to the Second Circuit to analyze the statute “as a 
speech regulation.”119 
Justice Sotomayor only joined the majority in the first half of this result. 
Specifically, she agreed that the Second Circuit’s prior decision interpreting 
the meaning of the statute should be vacated.120 Nevertheless, rather than re-
manding the case to the Second Circuit to consider the statute as a speech 
regulation as the Roberts’ majority concluded, Sotomayor would have re-
manded it to the Second Circuit with certification instructions to the New 
York Court of Appeals for clarification.121 In other words, she would have 
preserved the opportunity, via certification, for a possible binding interpreta-
tion of the statute by New York’s highest appellate court,122 reasoning that the 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See Expressions Hair Design II, 137 S. Ct. at 1158–59 n.6 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“The Court’s silence on the relevance of the avoidance canon to the Second Circuit’s interpreta-
tion is consistent with an unexpressed conclusion, with which I disagree, that no narrowing con-
struction is available that would avoid constitutional concerns or that a broader constriction [sic] 
raises no constitutional concerns.”). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 1151 (majority opinion) (reasoning that the statute regulates how merchants com-
municate their prices and does not focus on the difference in the amount merchants can charge 
cash paying and credit card paying customers). 
 118 Id. at 1152; see id. at 1150 (“The Court of Appeals concluded that § 518 posed no First 
Amendment problem because the law regulated conduct, not speech.”). 
 119 Id. at 1151. 
 120 Id. at 1153 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 121 Id. 
 122 See Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941) (holding that “the 
duty rests upon federal courts to apply state law under the Rules of Decision statute in accordance 
with the then controlling decision of the highest state court”); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64, 66 (1938) (calling it “well settled” that state court decisions “are pertinent and, under 
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statute did not raise any First Amendment concerns. This would allow the 
Supreme Court to later avoid a constitutional question. 
In addition to possibly avoiding a constitutional question, another factor 
suggests certification was more appropriate in Expressions Hair Design than 
in Mansky—namely, that the former case was not nearly as old as the latter. 
Specifically, the plaintiffs in Expressions Hair Design filed their complaint in 
2013123 and the Supreme Court ruled on it just four years later in 2017.124 By 
contrast, the complaint in Mansky was filed in 2010125 and the Supreme Court 
did not rule on it until 2018,126 eight years later. Thus, a certification request 
by the Supreme Court in Expressions Hair Design for clarification of the rel-
evant statute would not have delayed ultimate justice for anywhere near as 
long as it would have in Mansky. Put slightly differently, because litigation in 
Expressions Hair Design was far less protracted than in Mansky, any delay 
caused by certification would seem relatively trivial in resolving the case. 
Furthermore, the expression at issue in Expressions Hair Design—
unlike in Mansky—was not political. Instead, it involved merchant pricing of 
commercial goods.127 Because the fate of political speech—speech that “lies 
at the heart of the First Amendment”128—did not hang in the balance, there 
was arguably less urgency for the Supreme Court to immediately rule in Ex-
pressions Hair Design than in Mansky, thus making any delay caused by cer-
tification more tolerable. 
                                                                                                                           
certain circumstances, controlling in ascertaining or determining the law of the State”). Professor 
Geri J. Yonover encapsulates the collective rulings from cases on this issue as follows: 
Where there is an on point, though elderly decision, by the state’s highest court, and 
there is “no confusion in the [state’s] decisions, no developing line of authorities 
that casts a shadow over the established ones, no dicta, doubts, or ambiguities in the 
opinion of the [state’s] judges on the question, [and] no legislative development that 
promises to undermine the judicial rule,” the federal court must, under Erie, follow 
the decision of that court. 
Yonover, supra note 41, at 307 (quoting Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205 
(1956)). 
 123 Expressions Hair Design II, 137 S. Ct. at 1148. 
 124 Id. at 1144. 
 125 See Mansky IV, 138 S. Ct. at 1884 (“Five days before the November 2010 election, MVA, 
Jeffers, and other likeminded groups and individuals filed a lawsuit in Federal District Court chal-
lenging the political apparel ban on First Amendment grounds.”). 
 126 Id. at 1876. 
 127 See N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 518 (2012) (“No seller in any sales transaction may impose a sur-
charge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar 
means.”). 
 128 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); see 
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361, 373 (remarking that “[t]he 
heart of the First Amendment lies in democratic self-governance, and when the government regu-
lates political speech, there is special basis for suspicion”). 
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With this background on both Mansky and Expressions Hair Design, the 
next Part argues that a key reason for the Court to exercise certification in 
First Amendment speech cases today is to reduce possible fracturing among 
the justices over the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny. 
III. COULD CERTIFICATION REDUCE FRACTURING OVER SCRUTINY IN 
FIRST AMENDMENT CASES ON TODAY’S SUPREME COURT? 
A compelling reason for the United States Supreme Court to engage in 
certification in First Amendment cases is the possibility that resolution of a 
question of state law interpretation by a state high court will later eliminate 
the possibility of fracturing by the justices over the appropriate level of scru-
tiny by which that law’s constitutionality should be measured. Put differently, 
clarification of the meaning of a state law by a state’s highest court might 
shed much needed light on whether the law in question merits heightened 
First Amendment scrutiny—be it strict scrutiny,129 intermediate scrutiny,130or 
the much more forgiving rational basis test.131 
This is a critical issue. The justices increasingly divide along perceived 
political lines over when a state law132—as Justice Clarence Thomas put it in 
                                                                                                                           
 129 The strict scrutiny standard of judicial review “applies either when a law is content based 
on its face or when the purpose and justification for the law are content based.” Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015). Under this test, laws are “justified only if the government 
proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Id. at 2226. Narrow 
tailoring under strict scrutiny, in turn, requires that the statute “be the least restrictive means” of 
serving the government’s allegedly compelling interest. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 
(2014); see Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (observing that a statute 
that restricts “the content of protected speech” will pass strict scrutiny only if “it is justified by a 
compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest”). 
 130 Content-neutral restrictions on speech are generally subject to intermediate scrutiny. Pack-
ingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017). Under this test, the government must 
prove that the law serves a significant interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. 
Under intermediate scrutiny, a statute “need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of” 
serving the alleged government interest in order to satisfy the narrow tailoring prong. Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). 
 131 See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing rational basis review). 
 132 The decisions examined in this Part of the Article were rendered before Brett Kavanaugh 
joined the Court. It considers Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel 
Alito and Neil Gorsuch to be conservative. It categorizes Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen 
Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan as liberals. See generally Mark Walsh, Center Court, 
104 A.B.A. J. 20, 20 (2018) (suggesting that it is likely Chief Justice John Roberts will become, 
after Justice Anthony Kennedy’s retirement in 2018, the Court’s new “median justice” who is “at 
its ideological center, as measured by political scientists who study the court”); Liptak & Par-
lapiano, supra note 32, at A16 (describing the “four-member liberal wing” as comprised of Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan; identifying the Court’s 
“most conservative members” as Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito; noting that Neil Gorsuch 
“returned the court to full strength and to a conservative majority” after the death of Antonin Scal-
ia; and adding that Chief Justice John Roberts is moving more to the Court’s ideological center); 
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2018 in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra133—
“regulates speech as speech” (thereby meriting heightened First Amendment 
scrutiny),134 and when it merely polices what Justice Stephen Breyer, penning 
a dissent in that case, called “ordinary social and economic” activity (thereby 
warranting deferential, rational basis review).135  
In Becerra, the five-justice conservative majority applied heightened 
First Amendment scrutiny136 to analyze a California statute compelling 
speech at licensed crisis pregnancy centers.137 It concluded that the petitioners 
challenging the statute’s constitutionality were likely to prevail on the merits 
of their First Amendment claim on remand.138 In direct contrast, the four-
justice bloc of liberal justices in dissent reasoned that heightened scrutiny was 
inappropriate139 and they concluded that the statute was probably constitu-
tional.140 
The exact same fracturing over scrutiny and, in turn, the fate of a state 
statute, occurred again in 2018 in Janus v. American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees.141 There, the five-justice conservative 
majority concluded that “[f]undamental free speech rights”142 were endan-
gered by a law compelling non-union public employees to contribute agency 
or fair-share fees143 to support the collective bargaining activities of the union 
that exclusively represents them.144 In striking down the Illinois statute, the 
                                                                                                                           
Jeffrey Rosen, A Notorious Advocate for Gender Equality, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2018, at B7 
(identifying the Court’s liberal justices as Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor 
and Elena Kagan). 
 133 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018) (holding 
that the notice requirements in the California statute violate the First Amendment’s free speech 
clause). 
 134 Id. at 2374. 
 135 Id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the majority’s application of the “con-
tentbased” test makes courts’ First Amendment analysis unpredictable and without strong founda-
tion that is rooted in reasoned principle). 
 136 See id. at 2380 (noting that the majority “applies heightened scrutiny to the” California 
statute at issue). 
 137 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472 (a) (West 2016), invalidated by Nat’l Inst. of 
Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. 2361. 
 138 See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2376 (majority opinion) (“In 
short, petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to the licensed notice.”). 
 139 See id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“There is no reason to subject such laws to height-
ened scrutiny.”). 
 140 Id. at 2379. 
 141 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 142 Id. at 2460. 
 143 See id. at 2489 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that agency fees are “now often called fair-
share fees”). 
 144 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6 (e) (2016), invalidated by Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (provid-
ing that non-union employees may be required “to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the 
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Janus majority rebuffed the argument that rational basis review should be 
used to examine its constitutionality.145 Writing for the majority, conservative 
Justice Samuel Alito opined that compelled subsidization of speech was a 
grave infringement on First Amendment rights that could not be tolerated.146 
Conversely, the Janus dissenters maintained that government agencies 
must have the ability to control their employees’ speech.147 Liberal-leaning 
Justice Elena Kagan,148 writing for the four-justice dissent, reasoned that the 
Court typically affords the government significant latitude to create policies 
that it deems necessary to carry out its role as an employer.149 She blasted the 
majority for abandoning the Court’s typically deferential style,150 and instead, 
“turning the First Amendment into a sword” to attack everyday economic and 
regulatory policy.151 
The rift over scrutiny separating conservative from liberal justices was 
revealed earlier in 2011 in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.152 It centered on a Ver-
mont statute that prohibited pharmacies from selling information about the 
prescription practices of identifiable physicians to purchasers for marketing 
purposes.153 At bottom, the outcome in Sorrell striking down the statute piv-
oted on the level of scrutiny that applied to the Vermont statute.154 The divi-
                                                                                                                           
collective bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours 
and conditions of employment”); Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460. 
 145 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465 (“This form of minimal scrutiny is foreign to our free-speech 
jurisprudence, and we reject it here.”). 
 146 Id. at 2464 (noting that “[b]ecause the compelled subsidization of private speech seriously 
impinges on First Amendment rights, it cannot be casually allowed”); see Savage, supra note 33 
(noting that since joining the United States Supreme Court, “Alito has been a steady, predictable 
conservative,” and adding that “[w]hen the court has been split, he has not joined with the liberals 
in any case of significance”). 
 147 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (reasoning that it promotes effective 
workplace environments and managerial interests). 
 148 See Adam Liptak, How Free Speech Was Weaponized by Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES, July 
1, 2018, at A1 (identifying Justice Kagan as “part of the court’s four-member liberal wing”). 
 149 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2493 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the Court’s attitude is 
“one of respect—even solicitude—for the government’s prerogatives as an employer [and s]o long 
as the government is acting as an employer—rather than exploiting the employment relationship 
for other ends—it has a wide berth, comparable to that of a private employer”). 
 150 Id. at 2494. 
 151 Id. at 2501 (reasoning that by using the First Amendment in such an aggressive way the 
Court is overriding citizens’ choices). 
 152 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 153 See id. at 558–63 (describing the statute, the legislative intent behind it, and Vermont’s 
interpretation of it). 
 154 Marcia M. Boumil et al., Prescription Data Mining, Medical Privacy and the First 
Amendment: The U.S. Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 447, 
448 (2012) (exploring the relationship between prescription data mining in the pharmaceutical 
industry, state laws used to curb access to physicians’ prescription data, and First Amendment 
implications). 
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sion, in turn, among the conservative and liberal justices over the appropriate 
level of scrutiny to apply to that law foreshadowed the split in 2018 in both 
Becerra and Janus. Justice Anthony Kennedy penned the six-justice Sorrell 
majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin 
Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito and a lone liberal, Sonia So-
tomayor.155 The majority determined the Vermont statute was subject to 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny because it burdened a particular view-
point of speech.156 
In contrast, the three-justice dissent—authored by Justice Stephen Brey-
er and joined by fellow liberal Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Ka-
gan—concluded that the statute’s impact on expression was in furtherance of 
managing a commercial enterprise and thus heightened First Amendment 
scrutiny was unnecessary.157 Under both this deferential approach and the 
intermediate scrutiny standard applicable in commercial speech cases,158 the 
dissent declared Vermont’s law constitutional.159 Breyer believed that the 
Vermont statute would have been deemed constitutional when reviewed un-
der both the commercial speech doctrine and an even less stringent stand-
ard.160 
For the dissenters in Sorrell, the majority’s application of heightened 
scrutiny in cases like it provides courts with an unnecessarily powerful tool 
for encroaching on the regulatory realm of the legislative branch in commer-
cial and economic matters.161 Significantly, Justice Sotomayor—the only lib-
eral to join with the conservative majority in Sorrell—expressed disagree-
                                                                                                                           
 155 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 555 (identifying the justices voting in the majority and dissent). 
 156 Id. at 565 (noting that the Vermont statute “impose[d] burdens that are based on the con-
tent of speech and that are aimed at a particular viewpoint”). 
 157 Id. at 581 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the statute’s “effect on expression is inex-
tricably related to a lawful governmental effort to regulate a commercial enterprise . . . [and t]he 
First Amendment does not require courts to apply a special ‘heightened’ standard of review when 
reviewing such an effort”). 
 158 See id. (“And, in any event, the statute meets the First Amendment standard this Court has 
previously applied when the government seeks to regulate commercial speech.”). 
 159 Id. As Justice Breyer wrote, “I believe that the statute before us satisfies the ‘intermediate’ 
standards this Court has applied to restrictions on commercial speech. A fortiori it satisfies less 
demanding standards that are more appropriately applied in this kind of commercial regulatory 
case.” Id. at 602. 
 160 Id. at 603 (noting that “whether we apply an ordinary commercial speech standard or a less 
demanding standard, I believe Vermont’s law is consistent with the First Amendment”). 
 161 Id. at 592 (reasoning that “because the imposition of ‘heightened’ scrutiny in such instanc-
es would significantly change the legislative/judicial balance, in a way that would significantly 
weaken the legislature’s authority to regulate commerce and industry, I would not apply a ‘height-
ened’ First Amendment standard of review in this case”). 
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ment seven years later in Janus with how Sorrell has since been used by the 
Court.162 
This division over scrutiny and, in particular, the conservative justices’ 
use of heightened scrutiny in First Amendment cases to attack government 
regulations has sparked much handwringing among academics.163 Academics 
worry about First Amendment Lochnerism, which occurs when the Court 
weaponizes the First Amendment to encourage extensive deregulation.164 
There is a concern that free speech claims are being used to attack workaday 
government policies, resulting in a completely transformed regulatory state.165 
A complete discussion of the academic debate over so-called “First 
Amendment Lochnerism” is beyond the scope of this Article,166 which in-
stead concentrates on question certification. What is important here, however, 
is that fracturing along political lines on such a fundamental issue as the ap-
propriate level of scrutiny to apply in any given First Amendment case poten-
tially undermines the Court’s legitimacy. The First Amendment already 
“float[s] atop a tumultuous doctrinal sea.”167 A doctrinal division along per-
ceived political ideologies compounds the problem. Furthermore, this rift 
                                                                                                                           
 162 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (calling the development of First 
Amendment jurisprudence troubling because the First Amendment is being used in an aggressive 
manner). 
 163 See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, The First Amendment and the Corporate Civil Rights Move-
ment, 11 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 22 (2016) (“I remain concerned that this expansive First Amend-
ment will prove to be an unworkable burden on beneficial regulation intended to protect public 
health, safety, and welfare.”); Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 
HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 166–67 (2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
03/vol128_PostShanor2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5HY-XTRK] (“Across the country, plaintiffs are 
using the First Amendment to challenge commercial regulations, in matters ranging from public 
health to data privacy. It is no exaggeration to observe that the First Amendment has become a 
powerful engine of constitutional deregulation. The echoes of Lochner are palpable.”). 
 164 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (declaring unconstitutional, as an inter-
ference with the right to contract under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a 
state statute limiting the number of hours bakers could work); Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. 
Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 337 (2017) (contending there is 
academic worry about “a new free speech Lochnerism—an exploitation of the First Amendment 
to promote a broad deregulatory agenda, regardless of popular democratic will”). 
 165 Bambauer & Bambauer, supra note 164, at 342; see also Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding 
the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. 
L. REV. 1389, 1393 (2017) (noting that “today litigants—often corporate litigants—increasingly 
use the First Amendment to prioritize new applications of the freedom of speech over regulations 
designed to protect consumers and citizens”). 
 166 See Enrique Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax, Everybody, 58 B.C. L. REV. 65, 82–
84 (2017) (explaining the impact of Reed on First Amendment Lochnerism); Jeremy K. Kessler, 
The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1920 (2016) (ob-
serving “contemporary liberal critiques of First Amendment Lochnerism”). 
 167 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2355 (2000) (examining the conflicting doctrines within free speech juris-
prudence). 
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must be contextualized within today’s larger political climate—an atmosphere 
in which the contentious confirmation hearings for Justice Brett Kavanaugh 
sparked a legitimacy crisis for the Court in the eyes of some observers.168 
How, then, might certification mitigate or ease the doctrinal schism on 
scrutiny? When an ambiguous state statute comes before the Supreme Court 
that impacts the level of scrutiny that applies to analyze the statute,169 then 
allowing a state high court to definitively sort out a statute’s meaning may 
remove or reduce the leeway that the justices possess to choose a level of 
scrutiny that seemingly comports with either a pro-regulatory or deregulatory 
philosophy.170 In other words, permitting a state’s highest court to decide if a 
state statute “regulates speech as speech”171 or whether it merely incidentally 
affects speech as part of “workaday economic and regulatory policy”172—
especially given that “almost all economic and regulatory policy affects or 
touches speech”173—might foster agreement among the justices about the 
correct standard of scrutiny when the case later returns to the Supreme Court 
after certification. More colloquially, letting a state court sort out the meaning 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Kavanaugh Will Kill the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 
2018, at A27 (“A vote for Kavanaugh will be a vote to destroy the legitimacy of one of the last 
federal institutions standing.”); Megan McArdle, There Is No Cleaning Up This Kavanaugh Mess, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2018, at A23 (“Putting Kavanaugh on the court under these circumstances 
has outraged the left half of the political spectrum and undermined the already shaky legitimacy of 
the court, and it will touch off a political firestorm if Kavanaugh becomes the fifth vote to over-
turn Roe v. Wade.”); Michael Tomasky, The Court’s Legitimacy Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2018, 
at A19 (“This is a severe legitimacy crisis for the Supreme Court.”). 
 169 As Justice Stephen Breyer encapsulated the problem in Expressions Hair Design II: 
“[b]ecause the statute’s operation [was] unclear,” uncertainty existed whether it should be subject 
to “a deferential form of review” or something else. 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1153 (2017) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). In other words, if the statute affected speech—not just conduct—and therefore raised 
a First Amendment issue (as the Supreme Court majority in Expressions Hair Design II concluded 
it did), it was still unclear whether either the intermediate scrutiny standard of the commercial 
speech doctrine adopted in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), should be used to analyze its constitutionality or whether a lesser 
standard akin to rational basis review adopted in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 
U.S. 626 (1985), should apply. Id. at 1151. 
 170 The perception here among the Court’s liberal justices is that the Court’s conservative 
members are applying heightened First Amendment scrutiny to strike down basic economic regu-
lations as part of a larger deregulatory agenda. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Sotomayor, J., dis-
senting) (“And maybe most alarming, the majority has chosen the winners by turning the First 
Amendment into a sword, and using it against workaday economic and regulatory policy. Today is 
not the first time the Court has wielded the First Amendment in such an aggressive way.”); Nat’l 
Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majori-
ty for “suggesting that heightened scrutiny applies to much economic and social legislation” simp-
ly because speech is involved instead of adopting a “respectful approach to economic and social 
legislation when a First Amendment claim like the claim present here is at issue”). 
 171 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2374. 
 172 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 173 Id. at 2502. 
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of a state statute might help the Supreme Court better sort out the standard of 
scrutiny. 
There is, of course, no guarantee that certification will reduce or elimi-
nate divisions among the justices over the appropriate level of scrutiny in free 
speech cases. Furthermore, certification is only proper where there is a novel, 
unsettled question of law.174 Nonetheless, the possibility of reducing fractur-
ing along political lines by sending an ambiguous statute down to a state 
court to gain a conclusive understanding of how it operates and what it does 
seems prudent at a time when the Court’s very legitimacy is threatened. Un-
less a case has languished in litigation and involves a law that possibly jeop-
ardizes core political speech, as was the situation in Mansky, addressed earli-
er,175 then a brief delay and detour through a state’s highest appellate court via 
certification appears to be a small price to pay for the chance of promoting 
harmony on scrutiny determinations when a case returns to the Supreme 
Court. 
What factors, then, might the Supreme Court consider in evaluating the 
suitability of question certification in First Amendment cases? Four factors 
seem particularly relevant, although they are not to the exclusion of other 
possible considerations: 
• Whether a case involves core political speech that might be unconsti-
tutionally restrained or restricted by a state law. There is more urgency for 
the Court to quickly weigh in on cases where political speech, given its privi-
leged perch in the First Amendment pecking order,176 is threatened. This, in 
turn, militates against certification. This factor therefore entails examination 
of whether the speech at issue is political in nature. 
• The length of time a case has been in either the state or federal court 
system. The principle here—as Part II illustrated, with its head-to-head com-
parison of the timelines of Mansky and Expressions Hair Design—is that the 
longer a case has drifted through a court system, the less likely a question 
arising in it should be certified by the Supreme Court due to the further delay 
it would cause.177  
• Whether resolution of the statutory ambiguity might help to clarify 
the level of scrutiny the Court applies to analyze a statute. This factor taps 
directly into the problem explored in Part III—namely, the frequent fracturing 
over scrutiny among the current justices, often along perceived political lines, 
in cases such as Becerra, Janus, and Sorrell. Because such divisions under-
mine notions of the Court’s political neutrality and, in turn, the Court’s legit-
                                                                                                                           
 174 Supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 175 Supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 176 See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (addressing political speech). 
 177 Supra notes 123–126 and accompanying text. 
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imacy, special attention to certification should be paid to cases in which certi-
fication might eliminate or reduce the odds of such splits. 
• Whether resolution of the statutory ambiguity might allow the Court 
to avoid a First Amendment issue altogether, thereby facilitating a facet of 
the long-standing doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Expressions Hair 
Design offered a prime opportunity for the Court, as Justice Sotomayor’s po-
sition in it illustrated,178 to exercise this principle. In brief, if state court reso-
lution of statutory ambiguity might eliminate the possibility of any First 
Amendment speech arising, then this militates in favor of certification be-
cause it comports with constitutional avoidance. 
No one of the four factors above should be determinative, of course. Ra-
ther, they should be weighed in holistic, totality-of-the-circumstances fashion. 
And ultimately, whether the Supreme Court adopts Justice Sotomayor’s new-
found propensity for certification in First Amendment speech cases remains 
to be seen. The intersection between certification and free speech cases, how-
ever, carries the potential to lessen current divisiveness on the Court over 
standards of scrutiny and, in turn, to promote judicial legitimacy. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article explored certification of state law questions by the United 
States Supreme Court in cases affecting the First Amendment freedom of 
speech. Justice Sotomayor’s very recent opinions in both Minnesota Voters 
Alliance v. Mansky and Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman calling for 
certification give the issue heightened and timely importance. Furthermore, as 
Part III contended, certification is relevant in possibly resolving splits among 
the justices over scrutiny standards in First Amendment cases. Reducing such 
rifts could bolster the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public, especially 
after the bruising confirmation hearings for Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Clearly, 
of course, certification is not a panacea for the problem of eroding judicial 
legitimacy. It may, however, help in First Amendment cases where battles 
over scrutiny take partisan lines such as in National Institute of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra and Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees. 
 Finally, the Article proposed a four-factor analysis for the Supreme 
Court to deploy when deciding if certification is appropriate in any given 
case. Those factors address: (1) whether political speech is at issue, (2) the 
length of time a case has been in the court system, (3) whether certification 
might alleviate the justices’ splintering on the correct level of scrutiny, and 
                                                                                                                           
 178 Supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text. 
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(4) whether certification might eliminate the need for the Court to address a 
constitutional question. These variables are simply starting points for analy-
sis; other considerations may also be relevant depending on the specific facts 
of any given case. 
  
 
